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FOREWORD
The volume now presented to the public · is an
attempt to chronicle briefly and accurately the
course of military operations in Manchuria subsequently to what happened immediately after the
outbreak of September 18, 1931, (vide the Herald
of Asia Library of Contemporary History. No. 4),
to which is added a short reference to the minor
trouble at Tientsin. The narrative is brought
down to the first week of February, 1932, it being
based on official data given out so far.
In some remote corners of Manchuria small
parties of troops led by the adherents of the
dispossessed warlords are still at large and give
some trouble. But it is generally believed that the
entry of the Japanese army into Harbin marks the
termination of the military stage in the history of
Manchurian rebirth.
The epoch just ushered in is marked by the
birth of a new and independent state. This seems
the logical outcome of the peculiar situation
resulting from China's miserable failure to function
as an efficient and responsible political entity. To
let Chang Hsueh-liang return to Mukden would be
to repeat the same disastrous experience. And
there is no leader who could be trusted to avoid
Chang's mistakes. The emergence of the independent Republic of Manchuria, therefore, comes very
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opportune. It may or may not prove a success,
but it is at least an experiment worth trying.
In the meantime, it may be worthwhile to make
it clear that Japan, in so far as it lies in her
power, will not countenance any policy on the
part of the new Republic of Manchuria contrary
to her traditional policy of the open door and equal
opportunity, and there is every reason to believe
that the Chinese and Manchurian leaders in the
new Government of Manchuria will remain true to
that policy. Time, however, is not yet ripe for
further reference to the new Manchurian state. It
is only just born, and it will be some time yet
before it will actually begin to function.
What is most satisfactory in connection with the
present situation, is the splendid unanimity of
purpose with which the whole nation has responded
to the call for service and sacrifice in the interest
of the country. Indeed, our people of all classes
have never been more thoroughly united than they
are now. This is the result in part of the tradi·
tiona! spirit of loyalty and patriotism, but it is also
the result of a strong and widespread recognition
by our people of the enormous importance of the
stake Japan has in Manchuria. Practically every
body in Japan realizes how closely and vitally our
welfare and strength is bound up with the assurance
of stable peace in Manchuria.
How strongly the nation has rallied round the
Army in connection with the Manchurian affair,
may be guaged by the amount of voluntary
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contributions sent in to the War Office for consol·
ing the men at the front. It had amounted by
February 10, 1932, to ¥2,100,000, while the consolation
bags received by the same date had totalled 1,300,000.
At the time of our war with Russia, the respective
figures were ¥1,260,000 and 590,000. These contributions came from all parts 9f the country and all
sorts of people. The same spirit has also found
expression in prayers offered at shrines and temples
for the prosperity of the Imperial House. The
same observation applies also to the public enthu·
siasm in sending Qff troops to the front or in
paying respects to the ashes of the officers and
men killed in action, when they are sent home.
The enthusiasm now shown in these respects
compare favourably with what was noticed during
the Russian war.
MoTOSADA ZUMOTO

Tokyo, March, 1932.
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I. BATTLE OF THE NONNI
1. Up to Outbreak of Hostilities
The first important conflict between the Japanese
and Chinese forces in Manchuria after the fightings
immediately following the now historic outbreak on
the night of September 18, 1931, took place on the
Nonni in North Manchuria at the beginning of
November. It was occasioned by an act of treachery
on the part of a detachment of the Heilungkiang
army stationed on the northern side of the river,
which, contrary to previous understanding, suddenly
opened fire upon a small party of Japanese troops
that had been sent there for the protection of the
repairs then proceeding on the bridges.
It may be recalled that shortly after the Mukden
incident there began a trouble between the Heilung·
kiang army under General Ma Chan-shan and the
army at Taonan under General Chang Hai·peng.
Consequently much apprehension was generally
entertained as to the safety of the Taonan·Angangchi
railway. General Chang was then making prepara·
tions for proceeding to Tsitsihar by that railway at
the head of his army, with a view to seizing the
provincial government of Heilungkiang. On the
other hand General Ma, by order of General Wan
Pu-lin, concentrated his troops at Tsitsihar to
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frustrate General Chang's northward expedition.
There is reason to believe that the Heilungkiang
army was in secret communication with the Soviet
army over the border, trying to secure assistance
in the form of arms and ammunition.
By the middle of October, General Chang's army
had commenced its northward march by the Taonan·
Angangchi railway. With its main body stationed
at Wumiaotze (north of Tailai), a part of the army
advanced to the neighbourhood of the Nonni, when
its further progress was stopped by the advance
guard of the Heilungkiang army stationed on the
opposite bank of the river with some field pieces.
Moreover, the railway bridges had been damaged by
General Ma's army on the 15th or 16th of October.
Under the circumstances General Chang had for
the moment to give up any hope of immediate march
upon Tsitsihar, and so he retreated with the main
body of his army to the neighbourhood of Taoan.
To make the story clear, it must be noted that
the Taonan-Angangchi railway was built by the
South Manchuria Railway under contract with the
Mukden Government. Starting work in March,
1925, it was turned over to that Government in
December, 1926, it being opened to public traffic in
March, 1927. The amount of money advanced by
the South Manchuria Railway Company was
¥17,000,000, of which ¥13,000,000 was the cost of
construction and ¥4,000,000 the price of the rolling
stock and other forms of equipment. As for the
repayment of this money, it was arranged
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(1) That the money required for the construction
of the railway and its equipment should be paid by
the Mukden Government immediately upon the
delivery of the railway, and
(2) That in case such payment is not effected
within six months after the delivery of the railway,
a special agreement shall be made in the form of
a loan contract at 9 percent annual interest.
But the Mukden Government failed to carry out
any of these terms, even refusing to implement its
obligation as originally agreed upon. Its indebtedness
to the South Manchuria Railway Company on this
score amounted by the end of June, 1931, to
¥26,000,000, principal and interest together. Under
the circumstances, this railway may justly be
regarded as property of the South Manchuria
Railway Company, forming one of its feeder lines.
In any case it forms a sufficiently valuable Japanese
interest to be protected against damage by any
body, Chinese or otherwise. Moreover, the present
stoppage of traffic over this railway happened to be
at a season when the farm products of North
Manchuria were being shipped southward, thus
causing no small loss to the railways concerned
and also to the farmers in the wide range of
territory tapped by those lines.
The Taonan-Angangchi railway authorities and
the South Manchuria Railway Company, consequently, made combined efforts, through our diplomati~
and military channels, to get the damage to the
railway bridges over the Nonni repaired by some
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responsible Chinese authorities. These efforts,
however, failed to bear any fruit, so it only
remained for us to undertake ourselves the necessary repairs under the protection of our troops.
It may be interesting to recapitulate some of the
facts connected with the fruitless attempts made to
get the repairs made by some Chinese authorities :
(1) On October 12, a Japanese member of the
staff of the Taonan-Angangchi railway, together
with three Chinese colleagues, went to the Nanni
bridges to make an inspection of the damage, but
they were not permitted to carry out their mission,
as a detachment of some 80 Heilungkiang troops
brushed aside their identification papers and forced
them to turn back at the point of their machine
guns. Their train was actually fired upon with
field pieces.
(2) On October 21, a Japanese plane reconnoitred
along the Taonan-Angangchi railway as far as the
Nanni bridges, where it was fired upon by the
Heilungkiang troops stationed on the north side of
the river. The matter was at once taken up by
our military authorities with the Heilungkiang
Government through Consul Shimizu at Tsitsihar.
(3) On October 23, Consul Shimizu opened negotia·
tions with the local Chinese authorities concerning
the repa:irs to the damaged railway bridges. The
Chinese authorities replied that, as they would
undertake the necessary repairs, the Japanese should
never interfere with the railway. They, however,
refused to say when the repairs would be made.
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They further declared that, in case the Japanese
attempted to undertake repairs, the Heilungkiang
army wouid prevent it by force.
(4) After repeated negotiations, General MaChanshan finally set October 30 as the date for starting
repair work. But as a matter of fact, he tried not
only to postpone the work but to intimidate us by
saying that behind him there was a Soviet army of
50,000 men.
Being now thoroughly assured that the Chinese
authorities had no intention of undertaking the
required repair work on the bridges over the Nonni,
the Directors of the Taonan-Angangchi railway
and the South Manchuria Railway Company decided
to start the repair work themselves on November
4, and applied to the headquarters of the Kwantung
Army for adequate military protection. This decision on their part was necessary in view of the
fact that the river was due to be frozen very soon,
in which case proper repairs would be impossible.
As for the military protection, its necessity was
obvious from the proved temper and past conduct
of the Heilungkiang army and the bandits who
infested the neighbourhood.
The Kwantung Army, thereupon, decided to
accept the application for protection, and issued
orders for the despatch of a . detachment to the
Nonni on November 2. At the same time an '
identical communication was sent to both the
Heilungkiang army and General Chang Hai-peng's
army, calling their attention to the following points :
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(1) That the Japanese army observes strict
neutrality as to the civil strife between the two
Chinese armies.
(2) That, in order to prevent unforeseen complications, both the Chinese armies should retire to a
distance of 10 kilometres from the nearest bridge.
(3) That for the time being the bridges may not
be used by either army for military purposes.
(4) In case of any interference with the actions
of the Japanese army or any hostile action against
it, necessary and efficient measures of self-protection
will be taken against the offending army, whichever
it may be.
It should be stated that the Nonni at this point
has a wide river-bed, measuring about 8 kilometres
from one side to the other. It is spanned by five
separate bridges, of which the three nearest the
southern (i.e. the right) bank were damaged. The
railway station at the southern bank is called
Kiangchiao, and that on the north bank Tahsing.
In order to afford efficient protection to the repair
party, it was evident that our detachment should
occupy Tahsing on the .north side. But a body of
Heilungkiang troops was in occupation of that
neighbourhood. So the Japanese army requested it
to move 10 kilometres further north.
The Japanese detachment detailed for the protec·
tion of the repair party consisted of a battalion of
infantry (three companies), with a battalion of
artillery (two companies) and a company of en·
gineers, under the command of Colonel Hamamoto.
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It was called the Nonni Detachment, and its
transportation was commenced on November 2.
The troops under General Chang, in compliance
with our request, retreated to the south of
Wumiaotze. But the Heilungkiang forces, so far
from retreating from their positions, were busily
engaged in warlike preparations, showing a provokingly hostile attitude toward our detachment.
For instance, when a scouting party proceeded on
November 2 as far as the ·second bridge to inspect
the actual state of the damage done, it was heavily
fired upon by the Heilungkiang troops. Again on
the morning of November 3 our scouting party
despatched on a similar errand found the third
bridge in occupation of Heilungkiang troops with
three machine guns which at once opened fire upon
it, so that it had to retreat without accomplishing
its object.
The disposition of the Heilungkiang army in the
neighbourhood of Angangchi on the night of
November 4, is shown on Chart 1.

2. Progress of Hostilities
1. November 4.
In compliance with an earnest request of the
Heilungkiang army, a party of Japanese authorities, ,.
including Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi, came
down to the Nonni from Tsitsihar, arriving at
Kiangchao at 8.30 a.m. They were accompanied
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by General Shih, Chief of Staff to the Heilungkiang
army, and a few other Chinese officials. From
there General Shih notified the commander of
the Japanese Nanni detachment to the effect that
the Heilungkiang army had no hostile intention
toward the Japanese forces. He left there almost
immediately afterward. Thereupon, the Japanese
detachment sent a small party (a company) to
Tahsing with two national flags, one large and the
other small. When it reached a point about 1,000
metres south of Tahsing at about 1.30 in the
afternoon, it was suddenly and unexpectedly subjected to a heavy fire from the Heilungkiang troops
stationed on the north side of the Nanni, sustaining
15 casualties. It had to fall back to the bridge-head,
where it joined the engineer company and waited
for the arrival of the main body of the detachment.
It was shortly after two that the detachment
joined the advance party at the bridge-head, where
it found in front a wide strech of marshy land
very difficult of negotiation. To add to its worry,
our artillery fire did not reach the enemy's position.
A frontal attack being under the circumstances out
of the question, the advance party was ordered to
outflank the enemy on his left side. It was thus
decided to wait for developments.
In the meantime our airplanes bombed the
enemy's position, doing considerable amount of
damage. But the enemy still continued to bombard
our position. By 4.30, however, one of our mountain
pieces was with great difficulty brought up to the
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back of our first line. It at once went into action
and succeeded in silencing the enemy's artillery.
All this while, the advance party under a heavy
fire from the enemy struggled through the marshy
land and succeeded in occupying an elevated
position about 3 kilometres north-east of Tahsing.
But the battle had not shown noticeable development
when night descended upon the scene.
The Commander of the Kwantung Army, acting
upon the report submitted by a staff officer who
bad been sent to observe the operations, issued an
order tonight for the despatch of another battalion
of infantry to reinforce the Nonni detachment.

2. November 5.
The main body of our detachment commenced
operations at four in the morning, opened artillery
fire at six and started a forward offensive movement
shortly after seven. The Chinese occupying a
strong position offered a stout resistance, and
owing also to the topographical disadvantage, the
progress of the engagement was slow. Our troops,
however, succeeded in wresting from the enemy
an important point about one and a half kilometres
east of Tahsing Station at about half past eight.
At ten our detachment occupied the enemy's first
line of defence. The enemy retreated seven or
eight hundred metres back to his second line of
defence where he continued to offer a strong
resistance. Our artillery experienced great difficulty

;
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in moving the guns, so that only three field and
three mountain pieces were brought into action by
ten o'clock. The result was that it degenerated
into a drawn engagement. Not only that, at about
three in the afternoon a superior force of the enemy
assumed an offensive against the right back of our
detachment, inflicting a heavy damage upon it. In
consequence, our detachment was forced to reform
part of its fighting line, and darkness fell upon it
still engaged in a difficult fight.
In the morning the staff officer despatched from
the headquarters had reported to the Commander
that the Heilungkiang army did not seem inclined
to retire, but that . it seemed intent upon making a
determined resistance. So the Commander ordered
two more infantry battalions and three artillery
companies to hasten to the support of the detachment. At 7.30 the first reinforcement, Nagura
battalion, arrived and at once took up position.
But it hardly sufficed to tum the scale decisively
in our favour, so that the detachment passed a
most anxious night impatiently waiting for the
arrival of the rest of the reinforcements.

3. November 6.
Today the command of the detachment was taken
over by Major-General Hasebe who had come with
the reinforcements. With the arrival of successive
units of the reinforcements, the fight assumed a
favourable turn. The enemy's units in the rear
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began to retire northward from about eight in the
morning, while a party of cavalry which had been
harassing us from early morning withdrew in a
northerly and north-easterly direction. The enemy's
first line still continued to put up a stout fight,
and it was only when an important position was
captured by Nagura battalion under artillery support
that the enemy began to falter, so that our detachment succeeded in occupying the enemy's position
a little after ten o'clock.
At noon our detachment concentrated its strength
to the east of Tahsing and took up a suitable
position for the protection of the party engaged in
repairing the bridges.
The enemy's infantry which fought in the vicinity
of Tahsing was not less than 2,000 strong. In
addition, a large body of cavalry also took part in
the fight. The main body of the retreating enemy
halted in the neighbourhood of Angangchi, while a
small portion continued the retreat to Tsitsihar.

4. Casualties.
I. On our side :
Killed-1 officer; 35 n.c.o. and men
Wounded-7 officers; 15 n.c.o. and 122 men
Total casualties-180
Aeroplanes damaged-3

II. The enemy left 200 dead, of whom two were
Russians.

,

II. BATTLE OF ANGANGCHI
1. Ma's Diplomatic Manoeuvring
When the Heilungkiang army was defeated at the
Nonni on November 6, our detachment which had
been joined by the second reinforcements and which
was about to be joined by a third party of reinforcements, could have easily launched a strong attack
upon the retreating enemy, thereby inflicting such a
damage upon him as would probably have fatally
crippled him. And our men in the first line were
eager to take such a course. But their commander
wisely refrained from it for fear lest it might lead
to an undesirable complication of the situation
contrary to the principle of peace underlying the
national policy of Japan.
But unfortunately the praiseworthy forbearance
shown by our commander was interpreted by
General Ma Chan-shan as a sign of weakness. He
accordingly halted his retreating army at a point
south of Angangchi only a few kilometres from the
Nonni, and constructed a strong position there.
Moreover, he summoned there reinforcements from
Heiho, Harbin and Manchuli. At the same time he
received telegraphic instructions from Chang Hsuehliang at Peiping, ordering him to utilize convenient
opportunity for exterminating the Japanese army.
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He was also idolized by his fellow countrymen as
a national hero. The result was that General Ma's
men were highly elated and longed for further
opportunity for distinguishing themselves. They
intrigued to create disturbances in the rear of our
detachment and also to injure again the bridges over
the Nonni. It was thus increasingly evident that
another collision between the Japanese and Chinese
forces was inevitable in that part of Manchuria.
But the Kwantung army headquarters did not
give up the hope of arriving at an amicable understanding with General Ma. So it caused its representative at Tsitsihar, Major Hayashi, to take the
matter up with General Ma at that town. Several
interviews took place between them on November
3 and thereafter, when the treacherous conduct on
the part of Ma at the Nonni and Tahsing was
pointed out to him, and he was urged to call his
troops back to Tsitsihar, at the same time guarantying the safety of the Taonan-Angangchi railway.
But General Ma did not respond to these overtures
in a favourable manner or in a spirit of sincerity.
On the contrary he seemed to be only anxious to
push forward his hostile preparations.
Under these circumstances it was clear that,
unless something was done to ease the situation, a
dangerous clash would become unavoidable between
the Japanese and Chinese armies. So the Kwan- '
tung army headquarters, with a view to placing the
Heilungkiang army and our Nonni detachment a~ a
safe distance from each other, made the following
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fair and moderate proposal to the Chinese side on
November 14:
(1) Ma Chan-shan should withdraw to Tsitsihar
and north of it, at the same time causing the troops
concentrated at Tsitsihar and the neighbourhood of
Angangchi in connection with the present complication to return to their original positions.
(2) Ma Chan-shan should not send his troops
south of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
(3) The Taonan-Angangchi railway will be
operated by the administrative bureau of that line,
and Ma Chan-shan should in no way interfere with
its operation. In case of such interference, the
Imperial army will at once take necessary and
efficient measures.
(4) Ma Chan-shan should carry out the conditions
mehtioned above within ten days from November
15.
(5) The Nonni detachment of the Japanese army,
after satisfying itself as to the carrying out of the
aforementioned conditions, will at once retire to the
south of Taoan or Chengchiatun.
Ma Chan-shan was told that his reply to the
above communication was expected by noon on
November 16. But nothing was heard from him
within the required time limit. Not only that, his
troops surrounded the Japanese Consulate at
Tsitsihar on the pretext of guarding it, and set up
military works in the neighbourhood with ordnances
trained at the front gate. The Consulate was
entirely isolated, all communication with the outside
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being prevented. Even Chinese servants were not
allowed freely to go out and get provisions. So
Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi were obliged to
leave Tsitsihar for Harbin on the morning of
November 14.
On November 16, at about 10 p.m., a telephone
message was received from Ma Chan-shan through
Chang Ching-hui, Director of the Harbin Special
District, to the effect that he was ready to accept the
whole of the conditions proposed by Japan, but that
he would formally reply by letter. This was ten
hours after the time limit set by our proposal, and
instead of being delivered, as it should have been,
through a responsible representative of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, it came through an
irresponsible third party. These and other circumstances apparently roused suspicions as to the
sincerity of General Ma. It looked as if he was
watching the possible change of atmosphere at the
Council of the League of Nations, and that his idea
in forwarding this belated message through an
irregular medium was simply to provide a diplomatic
excuse in view of future negotiations, a customary
Chinese procedure. Accordingly instructions were
sent to the Japanese officers at Harbin to exercise
circumspect judgment in connection with this
matter.
The promised written answer did not come to the
hands of these officers up to 1 p.m. on November
17. So they made inquiries of General Liu, Civil
Administrator and Representative of the Heilung·
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kiang Government. It, then, transpired that a
telephone message had been received at his office
from General Ma to the following effect :
(1) That the Japanese detachment should retire
simultaneously with the Heilungkiang army.
(2) That activities of bandits and other circum·
stances might necessitate the despatch of troops
south of the Chinese Eastern Railway for the
purpose of preserving peace and order.
(3) That the acceptance of the Japanese proposal
would be impossible except on condition that the
Japanese army would not permit General Chang
Hai-peng's troops to enter Heilungkiang Province.
On the same afternoon Consul-General Ohashi at
Harbin also received an answer which was no more
reassuring as to the sincerity of General Ma than
that addressed to the military mission already
referred to.
While thus dilly-dallying with the Japanese army
on the spot, General Ma reported to General Chang
Hsueh-liang and General Wang Pu·lin at Peiping that
he had peremptorily rejected the Japanese proposal.
At the same time he caused foreigners at Harbin
to send out telegrams saying that he had accepted
the Japanese overtures. He evidently intended to
play up to the League of Nations Council with a
view to turning the scale of diplomacy in favour of
his country.
As a matter of fact the Chinese troops on the
spot, numerically much stronger than the Japanese,
began to show increasing activities from about
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November 11, assuming a provocative attitude.
Forestalling the arrival of the relief party from the
8th Division, the Chinese forces started offensive
movements on November 17. The challenge was accepted by our detachment which at once began action.
Even then the Chinese did not give up their
game of diplomatic manoeuvring. At one o'clock
on the afternoon of November 18, that is to say two
days after the lapse of the time limit for reply,
Generals Liu and Chang, speaking for General Ma,
forwarded another reply to this effect :
(1) That the forces concentrated in the neighbour·
hood of Angangchi in connection with the present
trouble would be evacuated within ten days.
(2) That as soon as the present trouble was
settled no troops would be sent south of the
Chinese Eastern Railway.
(3) That the Taonan-Angangchi line being a
Chinese railway, it was China's responsibility to
protect it, and that it would be operated upon the
settlement of the present trouble, Chinese agreeing
to the condition that she should offer no interference with its operation.

2. Strength and Disposition of Ma's Army
As already stated General Ma, while indulging in
prevaricatory manoeuvres in regard to the repeated
overtures of the Commander of the Kwantung
Army for peace, was actually engaged in military
preparations. He concentrated in the neighbourhood
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of Tsitsihar the greater part of the Heilungkiang
army and of the military guards of the Chinese
Eastern Railway, consisting altogether of between
20,000 and 30,000 infantry and cavalry, 30 pieces
of artillery, over 10 pieces of trench mortars, and
2 anti-aircraft guns. Of these, the forces concentrated in the neighbourhood of Angangchi comprised
approximately 7,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 20
pieces of artillery. They were encamped along a
line which, starting from Tahsingtun, extended
through Hsiaohsintun and Sanchienfang to the west
of the last mentioned place, with the cavalry placed
in front of the left wing. A separate position was
prepared facing west at a place to the south-west
of Fulaerhchi. The disposition of General Ma's
forces on or about November 8 is shown in the
accompanying sketch on page 19.
It appears that General Ma completed the final
disposition of his troops on November 11, when
their activities became particularly noticeable. The
following morning his cavalry was sent to the right of
the Nonni detachment. Its vanguard now and then
appeared in front of our line, thereby occasioning
minor conflicts. The situation steadily became serious.
On the night of November 13, a portion of
General Ma's army ventured forth to Changhuayuan
and Alihsintun, thereby threatening to envelop our
detachment.
The relative positions of the two opposing forces
on November 14, were as given in the accompanying
sketch map on page 20.
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According. to the subsequent information brought
in by our scouting planes, the Heilungkiang army's
line to the east and west of Sanchienfang was
steadily extended, its right wing reaching to a point
some 1,000 metres south of Telimu. The different
positions were connected by deploying trenches.
The enemy apparently worked hard at night. His
positions at Tahsingtun, Hsiaohsintun and Sanchienfang were soon surrounded with earth works with
protected rifle holes, covered spaces, machine gun
emplacements, and other appointments, which clearly indicated that this section was his central position.
There were altogether four lines up to Tsitsihar.
They were as follows :
(1) The line stretching east and west of Sanchienfang, with about 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, about
2,000 cavalry, and about 20 pieces of artillery.
(2) The line extending from Angangchi eastward
to Yushutun and Taiwangsanchiatze, with about
1,000 infantry, and about 700 cavalry. Besides, in
the neighbourhood of Fulaerhchi there were stationed
about 2,000 infantry, and about 1,000 cavalry, with
2 guns.
(3) The line extending westward to Ssuchiatze
from Shihwulitun, 10 kilometres south of Tsitsihar.
(4) The line extending westward from the South
Barracks, south of Tsitsihar.
The last mentioned two lines were not yet actually
manned by troops, but for that purpose there were
kept in readiness at Tsitsihar a body of reserves
consisting of the students of the branch military
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academy and the school for non-commissioned
officers, the reserve regiments and part of artillery
corps.

3. Activities of Japanese Army Prior
to Engagement
After the battle on the Nonni, the Nonni detachment (whose main body consisted of 4! battalions
under the command of Major- General Hasebe)
remained in the vicinity of Tahsing to protect the
repairs of the bridges. By November 10, the repair
work had progressed barely sufficient to allow open
cars to pass. In the meantime the planes belonging
to the detachment were daily engaged in scouting
over the enemy's positions, principally at Angangchi.
They were every time exposed to the enemy's fire,
which was particularly severe on November 9, when
fliers were wounded by anti-aircraft guns.
It was probably a mere coincidence, but it is
noteworthy that on the day (November 11) when it
was decided to despatch to Manchuria a contingent
from the 8th Division under the command of MajorGeneral Suzuki to relieve the mixed Brigade from
Chosen (Korea), General Ma's army, as already
stated, commenced to show increased activities,
succeeding in nearly enveloping the Nonni detachment. It being increasingly evident that Ma meant
shortly to assume the offensive, the headquarters of
the Kwantung Army, in order to be prepared for
emergencies, ordered the main body of the 2nd
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Division to proceed to Tahsing on November 13,
when the temporary repairs on the Nonni bridges
were completed and the trial passage of a train
was successfully carried out.
In view of a possible offensive by the enemy, the
Nonni detachment concentrated its main force in
the neighbourhood of Tahsing, sending a contingent
(two battalions of infantry and two companies of
cavalry) to Tsienilipa to watch for developments
and beat back the enemy's cavalry that had
ventured to the back of our right wing. A party
of our cavalry today was attacked by a superior
b:>dy of the enemy's cavalry in the neighbourhood
of Wunotouchan about 10 kilometres north-east of
Tahsing, sustaining several casualties. A part of
the detachment occupied, after a light engagement,
W unotouchan and an elevated position about 1,500
metres south of Tangti.
The main body of the 2nd Division nearly completed its concentration at Tahsing and the neighbourhood of Kiangchiao. This part of the field
passed into the control of the commander of the
2nd Division. The aggregate strength of our
forces available for this district was 3,000 men,
infantry and cavalry combined, with a little over
20 pieces of artillery.
'
The Japanese forces were still too small, and as
it became evident that Ma's army intended to turn
into the offensive before the arrival of our relief
party on its way from the 8th Division, it was
decided on November 17, as an emergency measure,
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to summon a part of the air forces respectively
belonging to the 3rd, 12th and 20th Divisions.

4. Offensive by Japanese
Ma's army showed a conspicuous activity on
November 17, increasing its strength along the
whole line, evidently with a view to starting the
offensive movement before the arrival of our relief
party and the newly summoned air force. Thereupon the 2nd Division decided, as a measure of
self-preservation, upon a counter attack. The plan
of action was to push the main attack in the
direction of Sanchienfang and neighbourhood, and
after breaking through the enemy's line and routing
him, to launch the main attack in the eastern and
north-eastern directions, thus extending the battle
front and endeavouring to crush the enemy in the
vicinity of his positions. The Japanese forces were
disposed as follows:
(l) The right wing (about 4 battalions of
infantry) to deploy east of the railway and attack
the enemy in the neighbourhood of Hsiaohsintun.
(2) The left wing (about 4 battalions of infantry)
to deploy west of the railway and attack the enemy
in the neighbourhood of Sanchienfang.
(3) The artillery, of which the main force to
take up position to the north of Tangti, while a
smaller contingent to take up position respectively
at the back of the right and left wings.
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(4) The reserve to keep in readiness south of
Tangti.
The respective parties started motion half an
hour after midnight on November 17, and by 3 a.m.
they took up positions 700-800 metres in front of
the enemy, preparatory for the attack. It was
pitch dark and intensely cold with the thermometre
registering 20 degrees below zero and the wind
blowing from the north-west at the rate of 15 metres.
About the same time the enemy's infantry began·
to fire in the dark, and as the eastern sky began
to grow grey at about six, more machine guns
and rifles came into play. But the Japanese troops
did not reply. At six-thirty, our artillery commenced
firing to find the range, and at eight started
bombardment which was kept up 'for about an
hour, during which time our air forces, in cooperation with the artillery, bombed the enemy's
position. As our artillery range was extended, the
first line of our infantry started the attack at about
nine. Hand to hand fights took place at several
points. Unable to stand our furious onslaught any
longer, the enemy began to retire along the whble
front at about ten-thirty, fleeing along the TaonanAngangchi railway on both sides of it. Thereupon
the 2nd Division pursued the retreating enemy
toward Tsitsihar, its main body marching along
the railway on the western side and a portion of it
on the eastern side. Hotly pursued, the enemy was
unable to make a stand at his second line of
defence iri the neighbourhood of Angangchi, retreat·
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ing from there northward at about two in the
afternoon.
The officers and men of the 2nd Division were
thoroughly tired as the result of continued and
strenuous exertions for the past several days, and
they suffered much from increasing cold and wind,
which froze their food and water. But nothing
daunted, they pursued the retreating enemy and
arrived at a point 4 kilometres south of Tsitsihar
half an hour after midnight on November 18. But
our troops were in some places badly mixed up
with the fleeing enemy, so that there was danger
of our own men fighting each other. It was, there·
fore, decided to concentrate the main body in the
vicinity of Tamintun, south of Tsitsihar, where
they had a long-needed rest.
At noon on November 19, the main body of the
2nd Division formed in two columns, and leaving
the line at Tamintun and Shihwulitun, they entered
Tsitsihar at three in the afternoon. The bulk of it
was quartered at the South Barracks and the
remainder at the North Barracks, leaving the duty
of keeping order in the town to the Chinese Director
of the Bureau of Public Safety.
The main body of Ma's army seemed to have
retreated in the direction of Hailun (120 kilometres
north of Harbin and on the Hulan-Hailun railway)
and Paichuan. By the nightfall on November 19,
there was not visible any important body of Ma's
troops, except small insignificant parties, within a
radius of 30 kilometres of Tsitsihar.
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Our casualties consisted of 31 killed, 104 wounded
and 13 missing, besides 300 cases of frostbite.
The Chinese casualties must have been very
heavy, but no reliable estimate has been forthcoming.
It is hardly necessary to state that during this
engagement the Japanese army took care to respect
the property of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It
also so arranged the plan of operations as to
prevent the Chinese troops from retreating along
the railway toward Harbin.
In conclusion it may be stated that this engagement was undertaken by the Kwantung Army
simply as a measure of self-preservation. Consequently as soon as Ma's army which menaced our
rights and interests had been disposed of, the main
body of our troops was withdrawn, without occupy·
ing that part of the country.

III. TIENTSIN INCIDENT

After the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble,
the sentiment among the Chinese at Tientsin grew
steadily more and more unfriendly toward the
Japanese. The Anti-Japanese Association's activities
became better organized. The situation was com·
plicated by the fact that the local Chinese, who
had never been particularly cordial toward Chang
Hsueh-liang, now grew hostile toward him, whose
maladministration they held responsible for the
Manchurian catastrophe. In order to check the
growing popular antagonism toward him, Chang
secretly planned to carry out a policy of drastic
suppression against the promoters of the hostile
movement against him.
The anti-Chang leaders got wind of this, and
with the object of forestalling the approaching
danger, they set about organizing a force of plain
clothes soldiers, which they styled The Nation
Saving Army. On the night of November 8, men
of this organization suddenly created trouble in the
Chinese city of Tientsin, attacking the guardians
of public order.
The Commander of our garrison there made a
public declaration of strict neutrality with regard
to the clash between the contending Chinese factions.
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Measures were at once taken by him for the
maintenance of order in the Japanese settlement
and the protection of the lives and property of the
Japanese residents.
But the Chinese guards stationed in the vicinity
of the Japanese settlement fired into a position
occupied by our troops, killing two of the latter.
Thereupon our troops had to return the fire as a
matter of self-defence.
The Commander of our garrison at once .communicated with the Chinese authorities, and requested them, with a view to avoid precipitating an
unfortunate crisis between Japan and China, to
order the contending Chinese factions not to
approach within 300 metres of the Japanese settlement. This request was repeated twice or three
times, but it was not readily acted upon. As a
matter of fact plain clothes soldiers constantly
made their appearance, the Chinese troops also
firing in the vicinity of the Japanese settlement.
The Chinese authorities continued outwardly
friendly, but there is reason to believe that th~y
were secretly fanning the anti-Japanese feeling of
their people. In any case the situation became so
serious that the other foreign garrisons mounted
guard in their respective areas from the 11th or
12th of November.
It transpired shortly afterward that the firing of
the Japanese position by Chinese soldiers, which
had been alleged to have been directed toward the
plain clothes men belonging to the Nation Saving
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Army, was really part of a deliberate scheme of
harassing the Japanese planned by Chinese officers
in high positions.
On this amazing fact becoming known, the
Chinese authorities offered a profound apology to
the Commander of the Japanese garrison. They
also promised to exercise a more effective control
over the anti·Japanese propaganda, to remove all
military works set up within 300 metres of the
Japanese settlement, and not to permit their soldiers
to approach within 300 metres of the settlement.
But the dangerous practice of firing into the settle·
ment did not cease, and the situation continued to
be disquieting. The Japanese garrison, however,
remained faithful to its own part of the agreement.
It called off part of its guard, restored the traffic
in the settlement to its normal condition, and in
the afternoon of November 26 it disbanded the
volunteer corps.
At eight that evening, the Chinese suddenly
opened a stiff firing upon our barracks from a
position to the west of it. Our troops did not reply
to it, but a remonstrance was at once made to the
Chinese authorities against the extraordinary
behaviour of their soldiers, demanding the cessa·
tion of the firing. They alleged that the firing
was directed against the Nation Saving Army and
was not meant for the Japanese settlement, but
they promised that in any case it would be stopped
before half past ten. But the firing did not cease
~ntil noon the following day. It was a deliberate act
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of hostility, so that our garrison decided upon the
only course left to it for the protection of the
Japanese life and property in the settlement. In
other words, it had to accept the challenge and
fight the Chinese.
On the morning of November 29, a representative
of the Chinese authorities called at the headquarters
of the Japanese garrison, and offered to withdraw
all armed people from the neighbourhood of the
Japanese settlement and also to remove all defence
works set up in the Chinese city. This offer being
accepted, the armed Chinese police were withdrawn
by the evening of November 29, while the defence
works were removed the following day.

\

IV. CHINCHOW EPISODE

1. Chinchow Government's Hostile

Preparations
After the battle of Angangchi, Ma's army seemed
for a while bent upon an attempt to recover
Tsitsihar. But on about December 11 there was
concluded a compromise agreement between hiPl
and Chang Ching-hui. In the meanwhile matters
were steadily improving in the Province of Fengtien.
On about December 16 General Tsang Shih-i, former
Governor of Liaoning, accepted the post of Governor
of Fengtien offered to him by a group of leading
inhabitants of the province. It was evident that the
movement for reconstruction was growing strong in
the three north-earstern provinces with the exception of the south-western corner of Fengtien.
In the neighbourhood of Chinchow, there was
stationed a large force of regular troops belonging
to Chang Hsueh-liang. Its strength was estimated
at about 35,000 men, with a fairly strong artillery
equipment. Its main body occupied a strong position on the right bank of the Taling-ho (see Chart
IV), while a detachment was stationed in the territory between that river and the Liao-ho. While in
this way preparations were being steadily pushed
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forward with a view to a clash with Japanese
forces, the auxiliary troops and volunteers under
the control of the Chingchow Government began to
show great activities as soon as the Japanese contingent that had been advancing to the west of the
Liao-ho turned back. These irregulars tried hard · to
cause disturbances along the South Manchuria
Railway.
Chang Hsueh-liang at first built high hopes upon
the support of the League of Nations. But when he
found that, Japan's attitude being determined, much
could not be expected from that quarter, he made
up his mind to fight Japan with the help and cooperation of Nangking. With this object in "iiew,
he concentrated to the east of Chinchow a strong
army of regulars, 35,000 strong, made up of 3~
brigades of infantry, a brigade and a regiment of
artillery. The first line occupied positions extending
along Changwu, Paichipu, Taian and Tienchuangtai,
with an advanced detachment in the neighbourhood
of Fakumen. Besides, as already stated, the territory
along the South Manchuria Railway was infested'by
a strong body of irregulars under the control of
Chang Hsueh-liang. It was made up of about
30,000 auxiliaries and about 5,000 volunteers. In
addition to these forces, bandits invited from different parts of Manchuria were being organized into
units. This was coincident with a general outbreak
of bandit activities along the main line of the South
Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden line,
causing no small damage to Japanese subjects.
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It is estimated by competent authorities that the
armed forces, comprising the regulars, the irregulars
and all other units under the direct or indirect
control of the Chinchow Government, exceeded
80,000. Heterogeneous as were their complexions
and formations, .they were all united in their hostile
attitude toward Japan. So unless Chang Hsuehliang was prepared to change his policy, it was
now clear that a clash was inevitable between them
and the Japanese army.

2. Reinforcements from Japan
In view of the increased activities of Chinese
troops and bandits in Manchuria and of the serious
situation at Tientsin, it was decided on December
17 to despatch a specially constituted brigade,
together with a force of heavy artillery and a party
of rear service men to Manchuria, while a detachment chiefly composed of two battalions of infantry
was sent to Tientsin.
By this time the organization of various irregular
contingents by the Chinchow Government had made
a great progress, so that disturbances of peace and
order by these forces now became more widespread
and serious than before. Taking advantage of the
freezing of the Liao-ho, they crossed that river to its
left bank in large force, and a large body of them,
2,500 strong, took possession of the town of Nieuchwang on December 26, while the district to its
north and west was in the occupation of several
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thousand volunteers. These forces, it is needless
to say, had penetrated so far eastward with the
object of creating diversions in the rear of the
Japanese detachment that was operating to the west
of the Liao-ho. By recent experience it was wellknown that the fighting capacity of these irregulars
was much greater than that of ordinary bandits.
Their comrades along the Antung-Mukden line also
showed no sign of lessened activities.
Under these circumstances, it became evident
that the troops available were insufficient for
suppressing irregulars and bandits infesting the
territory west of the Liao-ho, in addition to dealing
with those threatening the various railway lines.
So on December 27, at 6 p.m., Imperial sanction
was given to the despatch of the headquarters of
the 20th Division and its Yoda brigade to Manchuria
to be placed under the orders of the Commander of
the Kwan tung Army. All these forces in due time
arrived in Manchuria.
'

3. Operations in West of Liao-ho
The disturbances caused by the routed soldiers
and bandits in the territory west of the Liao-ho,
and which threatened to spread to regions nearer
the· South Manchuria Railway lines, having become
very serious, the main body of the Kwantung Army
was ordered to suppress these marauding bands of
Chinese peace breakers. The Japanese army started
on its important expedition on December 28, the
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Kamura Brigade proceeding along the PeipingMukden Railway and the Taman division along its
branch line. The main part of that division left
Tienchuangtai on December 28, and proceeded along
the route assigned to it, always taking care to
exercise proper pressure upon such Chinese troops
and auxiliaries as may happen to be in the neighbourhood. It reached Tawa at dark, and the following
day it continued its march. At two in the afternoon its vanguard occupied Panshan after a slight
fighting. The Chinese force occupying that place
was about 500 strong, made up of regular troops
belonging to the 19th brigade (654th regiment)
who . were in cooperation with auxiliaries. The
division reached the neighbourhood. of Huchiawupu
on December 30.
·The Kamura brigade left Hsinmintun on December
30,. and proceeding along the main line of the
Peiping-Mukden Railway, reached Tahushan at
nightfall. On the way it met and dispersed some
parties of marauders.
On December 31, the Kamura brigade reached the
neighbourhood of Koupangtze. As for the Tamon
division, a part of it reached Koupangtze, while its
main force reached a point to the south-east of that
place on the same day.
1 On January 1, the Kamura brigade proceeded in
the direction of the Taling-ho and reached Shihshanchan at noon, while the train that carried its
vanguard arrived at the railway bridge over the
Taling-ho, at 3 p.m. The Tamon division was
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occupied in concentrating its forces in the neighbourhood of Koupangtze.
The; <:hinese forces that took part in the engagements east of the Taling-ho comprised two regiments
of the 19th brigade, nearly the whole of the 20th
brigade, a portion of the 3rd cavalry brigade and
volunteers.
The casualties they sustained are
estimated at 2,000.
At daybreak on January 2, the Yoda brigade,
· now forming part of the Muro division, advanced
by the Peiping-Mukden Railway to the rear of the
Tamon division. That night the Kamura brigade
was quartered in villages between Shuangyangtien
(8 kilometres east of Chinchow) and Talinghotien;
while the Yoda brigade stayed at villages between
Shihshanchan and Koupangtze.
The K<jlmura
brigade, which had been restored by the Commander of the Kwantung Army to the Muro division,
was charged with the task of occupying Chinchow.
The vanguard of the above mentioned brigade
entered Chinchow early on the morning of Janu~ry
3, while the headquarters of the division arrived
there at 10.40 the same afternoon. The commander
of the division was welcomed on arrival at the railway station by a large crowd of important people,
including the heads of the various Government and
municipal offices and leading citizens. The streets
were lined by dense crowds of happy looking
people, while the houses on both sides were adorned
with Japanese flags.
On January 4, it was as a whole quiet and peace-

-

38 -

ful at Chinchow and neighbourhood, but at night a
party of our patrols was fired upon by bandits.
Lieutenant-General Muro ordered a detachment,
whose main body was composed of a battalion
commanded by a colonel, to advance west of Chin·
chow. It proceeded this day as far as Lienshan.
On January 5, the Muro division despatched a
detachment each to Ichow and Suichung. A part
of the detachment sent to the latter place continued
its march southward on the following day to keep
order in the region west of Suichung. Its advance
party, on reaching Tsienso (about 20 kilometres east
of Shanhaikwan), established a definite contact with
the Japanese garrison at the latter place.
A troop of cavalry belonging to the above men·
tioned detachment was sent to Chinsi, and at about
noon the next day it put to rout a party of about
80 soldier bandits at a point about 10 kilometres
west of Chinchow.

4. Withdrawal of Chinese Army inside
the Great Wall
On the night of December 29, that is to say
before our army reached the Taling-ho line, the
Chinese army in and round Chinchow began to
evacuate by the Peiping·Mukden Railway. It appears
that a part of the army withdrew in the direction
of Jehol. As to the forces that retreated within the
Wall, a brigade each seems to have been concen·
trated at Lanchow, Changli and Tangshan.
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The Chinese detachment that had stayed behind
at Suichung commenced evacuation on the morning
of January 5, while those stationed at Shanhaikwan
and in the region east of it also withdrew inside
the Wall on the night of January 5.
This was a pitiable ending of the rather grandiose
attempt which Chang Hsueh-liang had made for the
recovery of Mukden. In view of the powerful pres·
sure which self-styled patriots brought to bear upon
him and also of the necessity of saving his face,
Chang Hsueh-liang had no alternative but to keep
up some show of spirit, although he may not have
felt much confidence in the success of further
resistance. Under the circumstances, evacuation
without resistance was probably the wisest thing
for him to do. There is, however, reason to believe
that Chang Hsueh-liang's motive in ordering a
peaceful evacuation was probably not so simple and
harmless as it may at first sight appear. At any
rate, the Japanese army had to face an aftermalh
which proved anything but pleasant or easy to deal
with. It is customary with a Chinese army wlien
defeated, to leave behind it troops of inferior quality,
so that they may combine with local bandits for
the purpose of harassing the enemy's rear. At all
events that has been exactly what happened in the
present case. The suppression of banditry in the
evacuated region has subsequently proved a rather
costly affair to the Japanese army.
The extinction of the last vestige of Chang
Hsueh-liang's authority in Manchuria undoubtedly
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marks an epoch in the history of that country. It
was a definite step in the consolidation of the
influences in favour of peace and progress in
Manchuria. It was undoubtedly in recognition of
this · fact that the Emperor chose this opportunity
for honouring the Japanese army in Manchuria with
a Message graciously acknowledging the heroic
services which His Majesty's troops had rendered
in different parts of Manchuria and exhorting them
to continue their valuable exertions with a view to
strengthening the foundation of peace in the Far
East.

V. HARBIN CAMPAIGN
1. A General Outline
The clash brought about on January 27 between
the Kirin troops, commanded by General Hsi Hsia,
and the anti-Kirin forces plunged the city of
Harbin and neighbouring districts into a state of
confusion, which was intensified by a series of
atrocities committed by the anti-Kirin troops.
They looted a number of Korean dwellings, attacked
the office of a Japanese owned newspaper, the
"Taihoku Shimpo," killed a Japanese military
officer, and kidnapped Japanese civilians. The
Japanese population in Harbin, numbering 5,600,
was placed in a state of extreme danger. Tlte
chairman of the Japanese Residents Committee
repeatedly appealed for despatch of military troops.
The Commander of the Kwantung Army, in view
of the situation, was finally moved to send to
Harbin a detachment of troops in order to guard
peace and protect the Japanese residents.
In the meanwhile, the anti-Kirin troops continued
to conduct themselves with bold insolence, making
no secret of their hostile disposition toward the
Japanese . .Wanton deeds were committed to harm
Japanese, ~ and malicious propaganda conducted
against them. The second Sungali railway bridge
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was destroyed by fire to impede the transportation
of our troops. In the vicinity of Shuangchengpu,
our advance forces encountered armed resistance.
Under the circumstances, our military forces were
obliged to take action against them. The enemy
forces holding positions to the south of Harbin
were consequently routed. Our troops entered the
city of Harbin on February 5.

2. Northern Campaign of the Kirin Army
The downfall of Chang Hsueh-liang after the
outbreak of the Manchurian trouble ushered in a
new era of hope for the thirty million people in
that country. The situation has since been fast
maturing for the birth of a new state where justice
and righteousness should hold domain. In the
province of Kirin a new government was set up
with Hsi Hsia at its head, with the object of
replacing the old corrupt system by a new and
better one. The populace has hailed the new
regime with enthusiasm, even many of the men
who had served under the former military power
having sworn allegiance. The only case of defection
was a group of military men who were formerly
under the command of General Chang Tso-hsiang,
head of the Kirin government under the old regime.
These men, still receiving directions from Chang
Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang in Peiping, set
up a provincial government at Pinhsien, a point
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northeast of Harbin, and refused to take orders
from the new administration at Kirin. Repeated
invitations having failed to win the allegiance of
these men, the Kirin government was at length
compelled to use force.
The military forces of the Kirin government,
starting their operations on January 5, directed
their way northward, meeting with but weak
resistances. Having routed the enemy forces along
the route, they took possession of Yushu on January
18. Thence they set their eyes in the direction of
Harbin, the centre of political and economic
activities as well as communication in North
Manchuria.
Alarmed over the situation thus precipitated, the
anti-Kirin men in Harbin met in council. With
the exception of the chairman, Cheng Yun,
practically all leaders, such as Li Chen-sheng, Fertg
Chan-hai, Li Tu, Su Te-ehan and others, in consul·
tation with Chin Hsuan-wu, representing Hsi Hsia,
adopted a resolution to the effect
(1) That their military forces would surrender
themselves to Hsi Hsia, who should provide them
with military expenses, and
(2) That the Pinhsien government would be
abolished.
General Chang Tso-hsiang in Peiping, hearing of
this, sent to Cheng Yun and Chang Tso-chou on
January 20 instructions to the effect that the
military troops, under the circumstances, should
place themSQlves under the command of General
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Chang Ching-hui, Governor of the Heilungkiang
Province, while the Pinhsien government should
declare itself subject to the Command of the
Harbin Special Area, a post which General Chang
Ching-hui also held. It was plain beyond question
that Chang Tso-hsiang's intention, in issuing such
instructions, was to preserve his former troops in
the name of the Heilungkiang governor. All efforts
at peaceful settlement having failed, Hsi Hsia
decided to settle the matter by armed argument.
His troops were again put in motion on January
21, one part advancing on Harbin through Shuangchengpu and the other by way of Acheng.

3. Conditions in Harbin
The Kirin troops at first found little to impede
their progress northward. They ousted the troops
under Feng Chan-hai, occupying Lalin, and reached
the vicinity of Acheng two days later. Having
arrived in the outlying district south of Harbin on
January 25, a portion of their forces was set to
clearing the regions about Acheng and south of
Shuangchengpu, their plan being to enter the city
of Harbin the next day.
However, in anticipation of the disturbances that
might be caused within the city by military operations, the Kirin troops sent to demand General
Ting Chao, in command of the anti-Kirin forces,
to remove his troops out of town toward Pinhsien,
with which the latter refused to comply. On the
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contrary, General Li Tu, Commander of the 24th
brigade stationed at Ilan, a point 60 kilometres
northeast of Harbin, suddenly entered China Town
(Puchiatien) of Harbin in the morning of January
26, at the head of two of his battalions. Falling
in with the soldiers under Ting Chao and Hsing
Chan-ching, they were soon in control of the
Chinese quarters and lost no time in plundering,
causing a panic throughout the city. The resident
Japanese population, of which 4,000 were Japanese
proper and 1,600 Koreans, were at once exposed to
serious danger. The Japanese residents quickly
rose to the situation organizing volunteer forces to
protect the Japanese colony, and aiding their
nationals to flee from China Town. One Japanese
and three Koreans were killed in flight by soldiers
belonging to Ting Chao's army. Several Korean
females were kidnapped. ·
The Kirin troops, who had been withholding
themselves, could no longer stay behind, almost in
sight of such disturbances in Harbin. They
resumed their march to save the city from
confusion, only to come into conflict south of China
Town with the soldiers under Ting Chao, Li Tu
and Chang Tso-chou. It was then that a Japanese
scouting aeroplane which had been despatched to
survey the conditions in and about Harbin,
particularly with regard to the Japanese residents
there, was compelled by some mechanical trouble
to alight on a farm to the south of Harbin.
Captain Shimizu, of artillery, who was aboard the
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machine, was killed by cavalry men belonging to
Ting Chao's army.
Whereupon our official representatives in Harbin
took up the matter with General Ma Chan-shan
who had arrived at the same city on January 27
in order to offer his service for mediating between
the Kirin and Chang Ching-hui army on the one
hand and the anti-Kirin troops on the other. The
murder of our scouting officer and residents was
reported to General Ma, as cases chargeable
against soldiers under Ting Chao and Chang Tso·
chou, demanding his serious attention. In the
night of the same day, however, the "Taihoku
Shimpo," a Japanese owned newspaper, was attacked
and looted by Chinese soldiers. Disturbances
became worse in the Chinese quarters. On January
28 the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other
Chinese associations jointly petitioned for despatch
of Japanese troops.
The Japanese residents in Harbin, on instruction
from their Consul General, began on January 28 to
gather at prescribed points in the town, and
organized volunteer forces for self-protection. The
Koreans in Puchiatien, numbering more than 1,500,
were brought under protection in the primary
school premises near the River Front.

4. Northern Movement of the Kwantung Army
The Kwantung Army, being well aware of the
lawless character of Chinese soldiers turning into
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marauders after a defeat on the field of battle,
decided to despatch for the protection of the
Japanese residents a detachment formed of two
infantry battalions under Major-General Hasebe.
The first difficulty then experienced was railway
traffic. The employees of the southern branch of
the Chinese Eastern Railway had practically all of
them deserted their posts. What was more, the Kirin
authorities had a number of carriages under detention with the object of transporting its own railway
guard forces to Harbin. Undue delay was caused
through these and other circumstances, so that it
was not before the night of January 28 that by
recourse to temporary measures three trains were
at length formed and sent northward. Their progress was next impeded by a portion of the Chinese
22nd brigade, stationed along the southern branch
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which, in an attempt
to interfere with our military expedition, destroyed
the second bridge across the Sungali River on
January 28, causing further delay in transit. Temporary repairs being made the next day, the military
trains forced their way across the river.
The Kirin army, on the other hand, in consideration of the damage to be caused to the civil population in Harbin by bombardment, retreated some
distance from the city, suspending its fire for the
time being. The anti-Kirin forces, however, continued to increase their ranks by the enrollment of
bandits. Their troops were being steadily concentrated about Harbin, stationing the main force on a
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line running from the southwestern end of the city
to Old Harbin, while another portion took its posi·
tion on the east side of Harbin. They openly
declared themselves in readiness to meet the Japa·
nese in armed conflict. From their manifest temper
and bold movement it was concluded that fighting
was in sight and unavoidable. The Commander of
the Kwantung Army issued an order on January 29
to Lieutenant-General Tamon, Commander of the
2nd Division, to advance his main force to Harbin
and protect the Japanese residents there.
The detachment under Major-General Hasebe,
overcoming a series of troubles on the railway,
pushed its march northward, until it arrived about
5 o'clock in the afternoon of January 30 at Shuang·
chengpu where it passed the night. Early in the
following morning toward daybreak an enemy force
(the main body of the 22nd brigade), some 2,000 of
infantry and several pieces of artillery, raided our
camp under cover of darkness. They advanced at
a time within a distance of only 20 metres from
our position, but were finally repulsed, after a sharp
engagement, about 10.30 o'clock in the morning,
with heavy damage, one of their units being almost
completely annihilated. Our casualties were 13 dead
and 35 wounded.
In view of the character of resistance to be
expected, the Commander of the Kwantung Army
ordered the troops in Tsitsihar to reinforce the
troops near Harbin.
In the evening of January 31 the Kwantung Army
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addressed an ultimatum to Ting Chao, Li Tu, Li
Chen-sheng and other leaders of the anti-Kirin army,
accusing them of their aggressive operations of the
same morning, and demanding them to resign their
positions in token of their allegiance. It was also
notified that, in the event of their failure to comply
therewith, the Kwantung Army would take action
against the whole anti-Kirin army as its enemy.
The anti-Kirin leaders were informed at the same
time that inasmuch as the Soviet authorities had
given their agreement to offer no interference with
military transportation on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese would not infringe upon the
rights of the same railway, and hoped that the
anti-Kirin army would likewise guard themselves
against any step likely to cause complication in the
same respect.
As for the management of the Chinese Eastern ,
Railway which at first showed an unfavourable
attitude as to the transportation of the Hasebe.
detachment, they were informed that " our army
being forwarded for the sole purpose of protecting
our nationals in Harbin, they should offer no interference with our military transportation." To this
the Soviet representatives gave formal agreement on
January 30. Nevertheless, the railway still continued
to be destroyed between Harbin and Shuangchengpu
and also in the rear of the Hasebe detachment,
considerably impeding the northern progress of our
troops The 2nd Division, under the circumstances,
managed to do the best it could with a limited
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quantity of rolling stock at its disposal, while it
began on February 1 to transport soldiers in motor
cars that had been concentrated at Changchun.
Continuing its progress under such unfavourable
conditions, the main force succeeded in concentrating
near Shuangchengpu in the morning of February 3.
With regard to the expedition of military troops
to Harbin, the Kwan tung Army issued on February
1 the following notice :
" The Japanese army has been despatched to
Harbin for the sole purpose of protecting our
nationals and maintaining the public peace in the
same city. Not only common civilians but even
men of military affiliations will be left free if they
refrain from any hostile action against our army.
The general populace are advised to feel themselves
secure and follow their peaceful pursuits. As for
the Chinese Eastern Railway and all other institutions owned by a third nation, the Japanese army
shall offer no interference, taking a strictly neutral
attitude. Although the Japanese army will remain
true to its aforesaid policy of justice and fairness,
it will promtly deal with any act of hostility or any
attempt to interfere with its work. Civil as well
as military people are hereby advised to repose
confidence in the Japanese army and properly shape
their conduct in accordance therewith. "
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5. Anti·Kirin Army in Harbin Well
Prepared
The anti-Kirin army stationed in and about Harbin,
which had assumed for itself the name of the
" Self-Protection Army " under the leadership of
General Li Tu, commander of the 24th brigade,
issued on January 31 a notice which may be
regarded as a sort of ultimatum running in sub·
stance as follows :
" Whereas the Japanese acts of aiding and abetting
internal troubles, and their seizing of railway trains,
even killing and wounding railway employees, show
the course they are bent on following with forcible
means, defying the dignity of our nation, we have
decided to mobilize all available troops for the
purpose of a combined armed resistance. Our end
being clear, we hold ourselves above thoughts of
success or failure. We hereby announce the forma·
tion of the Self-Protection Army, praying for the
support of all our brethren-,.
In the meantime Chang Hsueh-liang had ordered
Ting Chao and Ma Chan-shan to hold Harbin in their
hands, while he strove to strengthen his own posi·
tion by enlisting the support of Soviet Russia
through Mo Te-hui who was in Moscow in charge
of Sino-Soviet negotiations. On the other hand, the
Pinhsien government which had been formed by a
handful of men, finding its geographical position
unsuitable for administrative purposes, set up in
Harbin what they called the Kirin Committee of
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Peace. Ting Chi as chairman was put in charge
of military, administrative and financial affairs, to
the end of attaining under one head an internal
solidarity against our army. Ting Chi, anticipating
the eastward advance of our troops from Tsitsihar,
ordered the guards of the western section of the
Chinese Eastern Railway to destroy the railway.
Consequently, the railway and other means of
communication were cut off between Harbin and
Tsitsihar on the night of February 2.
In the rear of our line, the railway guard force
(1 company of the Independent Railway Guards) at
Lalinchia, a point about 25 kilometres south of
Shuangchengpu, was assaulted on February 1 by a
Chinese force of 1,000 men. The next day our
company of railway guards at Changchiawan, about
· 70 kilometres north of Changchun, was attacked bY.
Chinese soldiers numbering about 400. The assailants were repulsed in each case with heavy
damage.
On or about February 3, the anti-Kirin army
about Harbin, which had steadily been adding to
its ranks, had swelled to a force of some 13,000 to
14,000 soldiers, who were disposed as shown in
the sketch on page 53.
The Right Area (about Kuhsiangtun) : about 1,000
men ; 6 pieces of field artillery.
The Central Area (between Intendantskaya and
Hospital Street): about 3,000 men-; 2 pieces of
artillery; light wire entanglements before the line,
and dwelling houses provided with defensive work.
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Enemy·s P0(5lti.ons nea-r Harbin

(Feb.- 3)
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The Left Area (about Old Harbin) : some 7,000
men ; 4 pieces of artillery.
The Cavalry Force : Several hundred of cavalry
men under the command of Feng Chan-hai.
The above, altogether about 11,000 in number,
formed the first line.
The Reserves: Reserve forces numbering 2,000
to 3,000 were stationed at Machiakou on the east
of Harbin and near Old Harbin.

6. Entry of the 2nd Division into
Harbin
The 2nd Division, which had concentrated its
main force near Shuangchengpu in the morning of
February 3, lost no time to advance northward.
Pressing upon inferior enemy forces along the way,
our soldiers arrived in the evening on the line of
the Weitangkou-ho, some 50 kilometres north
of Shuangchengpu, where they passed the night.
Resuming the march northwatd the following
morning, the Division came upon the enemy line
about 11 a.m. At 3.30 p.m. our objective was set
on Paicliiawupeng and Hospital Street, forming the
centre of the enemy line. A part of our forces then
started operations against the enemy's right wing,
advancing within 400 to 500 metres from their
position, where they passed the night. On the same
night another part of the Division, making a night
raid, occupied a sector of the enemy line near the
monument standing in honour of two Japanese
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heroes in the war with Russia, near the southeast
end of Hospital Street.
The 2nd Division resumed the offensive in the
morning of February 5. When the enemy line
began to show signs of wavering at about 10 a.m.,
our troops intensified their action until they took
possession of the enemy's position around noon.
Toward 3 p.m. the enemy forces, completely routed,
were ~eeing from Harbin towards Pinhsien and
elsewhere.
The city of Harbin had been restored to peace.
The Japanese residents had been freed from the
grip of terror. They, with Russian and even Chinese
population, came forth to receive the entry of our
army into Harbin with heartiest ovations.
In this connection it is important to note that our
military forces, in conducting their operations in
this campaign, took every precaution to prevent
disturbances to foreign residents, and directed with
scrupulous care their rifle and artillery fire and
every other offensive action, so as to avoid the
railway and other public institutions in the city.
The Self-Protection Army, having abandoned
Harbin, moved its main force in the direction of
Pinhsien. A section of their troops have since gone
as far as Hulan, north of Harbin, while the other
toward Acheng, south of Harbin. An independent
detachment (affiliated bandit soldiers) under Kuan
Chung-hai directed its course to Acheng. Ting Chao
and Li Tu are thought to have fallen back to Hulan,
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and Feng Chan·hai to Pinhsien, where they /are no
doubt collecting their routed ranks.
Through the military operations near Harbin
lasting 5 days from February 4, our casualties were
31 killed and 65 wounded. While the enemy's
casualties are not definitely known, they have
beyond doubt suffered considerably heavier damage.
The progress of military operations in this
campaign is shown in the sketch on page 56.

7. Conclusion
The trouble in Harbin, which called for the above
military action, was occasioned by internal disagree·
ment within the Chinese military camp, with its
centre at Harbin. The trouble sprang up just when
Manchuria, with the support of her military and
other influential elements, was paving the way for
the creation of a new independent state comprising
Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and a part of
Mongolia whence the old regime had been driven
off. The disturbances caused in this way threatened
the lives and property of not only our own people
but many other resident nationals there ; but they
were put an end to by the prompt and timely
action of our army. In a way, the above campaign
has served to clear North Manchuria of what had
still remained of the old military power, thus
removing an obstacle that had stood in the way of

II
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bringing the new state into being, materially
clearing the atmosphere for the outlook for future.
We are pleased to add in conclusion that Soviet
Russia and her representatives on the management
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, properly appreciating the rightful policy of Japan, adopted a fairminded attitude toward our military operations in
and round Harbin.
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